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ESSAY 
 
ORIGINAL CITIZENSHIP 
JOSH BLACKMAN†
“These original citizens were the founders of the United States.”
 
1
INTRODUCTION 
 
The phrase “citizen of the United States” is used in the United 
States Constitution in three different provisions—to set the qualifica-
tions for representatives,2 senators,3 and the president.4
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  If these sec-
tions—the oft-dubbed “bright-line” constitutional rules—are to have 
any meaning, the United States of America, and citizenship thereof, 
1
DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE CHARACTER 
AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1789).   
2
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not 
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall 
be chosen.” (emphasis added)). 
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have at-
tained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who 
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.” 
(emphasis added)). 
4
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to 
the Office of President.” (emphasis added)). 
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must have predated our Constitution.  This raises two seemingly ob-
vious yet largely unanswered questions.  First, how did one constitu-
tionally become a “citizen of the United States” prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution on June 21, 1788?5
The answer to the second question seems simple.  The likely start-
ing points are finite:  the Declaration of Independence was signed on 
July 4, 1776; the Articles of Confederation were ratified on March 1, 
1781; the Treaty of Paris was signed on September 3, 1784; the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention signed the Constitution on 
September 17, 1787; and the Constitution was ratified on June 21, 
1788.  The first Congress held its initial meeting on March 4, 1789, at 
Federal Hall in New York City.  If a senator needed to have “been nine 
Years a citizen of the United States” on March 4, 1789, the senator 
would have needed to be a U.S. citizen since March 4, 1780, at the lat-
est.  This date precedes all of the other possible “starting points” ex-
cept July 4, 1776.  Assuming that members of the first Senate met the 
requisite citizenship qualifications,
  Second, for purposes of 
citizenship, and the Constitution, when did the United States of 
America begin? 
6
While Americans are fond of celebrating the birthday of the Unit-
ed States every year on July 4th, this date, as well as the Declaration, 
has no constitutional significance.
 simple arithmetic indicates that 
the United States first existed as a nation when we separated from 
England. 
7
 
5
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2001).  (“On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state 
to ratify the Constitution.  Under the plain terms of Article VII, that would seem to be 
enough to bring the Constitution into effect.  States that subsequently ratified the 
Constitution, with or without knowledge of New Hampshire’s decisive action, were 
electing to join an already existing union.”). 
  Fireworks and barbecue aside, for 
legal purposes the practical starting date of the U.S. is 1789, when 
6
There was a prominent challenge to the qualifications of one member of the 
House in 1789.  See infra note 156 and accompanying text; CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS 
IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, at 23 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall, eds. 1834) (discussing 
the case of Representative William Smith). 
7
See, e.g., Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 108 (1901) (quoting 
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159 (1897)) (disavowing any force 
of law inherent in the Declaration but remarking that “it is always safe to read the let-
ter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence”); see also Lee 
J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution:  A Unique Role 
in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006) (arguing that the 
Declaration is not legally binding). 
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President Washington was inaugurated and the first Congress met.8  
Our courts do not take cognizance of the Declaration.  Yet to a mem-
ber of the first Congress or a federal judge in 1789, the United States 
was not an infant, but was an old, familiar friend, and by 1789, such 
congressmen and judges had no doubt considered themselves to be 
U.S. citizens for quite some time.  The Constitution merely 
represented a new form of government for a preexisting country.  Ar-
ticle VII concludes that the Constitution was submitted to the states in 
the year “of the Independence of the United States of America the 
Twelfth.”9  The Constitution includes a direct textual and historical 
link to the Declaration and the year 1776.10
The answer to the first question of how one constitutionally be-
came a “citizen of the United States” prior to 1789 is to be found by 
studying these preceding years of Independence.  While in many cases 
the record and views on citizenship conflict, inevitably a single theory 
emerges:  our traditional view of citizenship cannot be correct.  Yet 
scholars seem to have entirely overlooked this issue.
 
11  Alexander 
Bickel wrote “the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal 
role in the American constitutional scheme,” and he likely assumed 
that the absence of any discussion of citizenship in the Constitution 
indicated that this topic was intentionally disregarded.12
 
8
See Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820) (“Both Governments 
[,under the Articles of Confederation and under the Constitution,] could not be un-
derstood to exist at the same time.  The new Government did not commence until the 
old Government expired. . . . In fact, Congress did continue to act as a government 
until it dissolved on the first of November, by the successive disappearance of its mem-
bers.  It existed potentially until the 2d of March [of 1789], the day preceding that on 
which the members of the new Congress were directed to assemble.”). 
  Citizenship, 
although not addressed, was not ignored.  Scholars were not looking 
in the right places to find the answer. 
9
U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
10
Id.  
11
While no other article directly addresses this issue, the journal Constitutional 
Commentary posed the question of George Washington’s citizenship as the topic of its 
second annual contest, asking whether he “was in fact constitutionally eligible for the 
Presidency.”  Contest:  Was George Washington Constitutional?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 137, 
137 (1995).  This elicited only a single (and light hearted) response.  See  Jordan Steik-
er et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously:  Constitutional Interpretation and the Cri-
sis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1995) (addressing whether a citi-
zen of Virginia prior to the ratification of the Constitution—namely George 
Washington—should be considered a U.S. citizen after the ratification of the Constitu-
tion for purposes of Article II). 
12
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975).  
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Part I of this Essay unites the Constitutional Trinity, from our “un-
animous Declaration,”13 to the “Confederation and perpetual Un-
ion,”14 to our “more perfect Union.”15
Part II discusses the legal and theoretical doctrines of citizenship 
as articulated by Lord Coke in Calvin’s Case and John Locke in his 
Second Treatise on Government.
  The continuity of the style “the 
United States of America” throughout these charters reflects the per-
manence of the sovereignty of this republic, despite changes in the 
form of governance.  Throughout the early years of our union, a na-
tional community was formed—the United States of America—and in 
this national community resided “citizens of the United States.” 
16  These theories provided the jurispru-
dential framework that influenced citizenship in the early years of 
America.  Part III explores how our early republic and the states un-
der the Continental Congress defined citizenship.  Immigrants who 
arrived in the United States after the creation of the Declaration re-
ceived citizenship in accordance with the naturalization policies of the 
states, as creating such policies was a role that the Continental Con-
gress specifically reserved for the states.  The citizenship of those who 
lived in the United States before the Declaration was primarily deter-
mined under two doctrines that derived from Lockean social compact 
theory.17  The first theory postulated that by virtue of residing in the 
United States at the moment of independence and separation from 
Great Britain, a person automatically became a citizen, regardless of 
whether that person was a Yankee or a dissenting loyalist.  The second 
theory contended that citizenship and allegiances could not be im-
posed on anyone, because to do so would be contrary to the spirit of 
the Declaration.  Rather, following independence, a person could 
choose or “elect” whether he wanted to become a U.S. citizen.18
 
13
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
  Al-
ternatively, he could exercise his right of expatriation within a reason-
able period of time, and thereby decline citizenship.  For the most 
part, all states adopted a naturalization policy that mirrored one of 
these strands. 
14
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777. 
15
U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
16
See generally Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 396-98, (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.) (distinguishing between aliens of nations at war with England and 
friendly nations); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION 149-50 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690) (discuss-
ing the relationship of persons with government). 
17
See LOCKE at 384. 
18
See infra Section III.B. 
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Part IV analyzes how these doctrines were applied at three critical 
junctures:  before the ratification of the Constitution, during the first 
Congress, and following the first Congress.  First, in treason cases, in 
order to distinguish between a disloyal citizen and a foreign alien 
combatant, a court needed to determine if the accused was a U.S. citi-
zen.  Second, because “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elec-
tions, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,”19 early records 
of contested elections in the House and Senate help explicate the 
contours of the original understanding of U.S. citizenship for House 
qualifications.  Third, in cases interpreting Jay’s Treaty,20
By fully appreciating the status of the first thirteen years of our na-
tion, and the constitutional and legal issues our nascent government 
faced, the riddle of original citizenship is unraveled. 
 the courts 
needed to establish whether a claimant was a citizen at the time of the 
Revolution in order to determine if certain barriers to recovery existed. 
I.  THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Before exploring the concept of a “citizen of the United States,” 
and when such citizenship began, an antecedent question is: When 
did the United States begin?  Our national identity began prior to July 
4, 1776.  Before the Declaration, the colonists commonly referred to 
this nation as the “United Colonies.”21  The so-called “olive branch pe-
tition” to King George on July 8, 1775, was signed by the “Twelve 
United Colonies.”22  The Continental Congress’s commission for Gen-
eral Washington on June 17, 1775, was issued on behalf of the “United 
colonies.”23  In Thomas Jefferson’s second draft of the Declaration on 
Taking Arms, from July 6, 1775, the Continental Congress spoke on 
behalf of the “United Colonies.”24  Article I of Benjamin Franklin’s 
draft of the Articles of Confederation, dated July 21, 1775, styled the 
confederacy as the “United Colonies of North America.”25
 
19
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 
20
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. 
21
DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:  A GLOBAL HISTORY 22 
(2007) (“[I]n the months immediately before July 4, 1776, and even within the text of 
the Declaration itself, the political bodies represented at the Continental Congress had 
been generally called the ‘United Colonies.’” (citing Edmund C. Burnett, The Name 
“United States of America,” 31 AM. HIST. REV. 79, 79-81 (1925)). 
22
2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 158, 163 (1775). 
23
Id. at 96. 
24
Id. at 128 (1775). 
25
Id. at 195 (1775). 
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From the quill of Thomas Jefferson, the United States was born 
with “[t]he unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of 
America.”26  This “appears to have been . . . the first time” the phrasing 
of “United States of America” was used, as “no earlier instance of its 
use in that precise form has been found.”27  Through the Declaration, 
the United Colonies became the United States of America.  This trans-
formation from colonies to states is memorialized in the final para-
graph of the Declaration, as “these United Colonies are, and of Right 
ought to be, Free and Independent States.”28  The Declaration “intro-
duced ‘the United States of America’ to the world.”29
The official manuscript of the Declaration that all of the delegates 
signed in July 1776—the version that now resides in the National Arc-
hives—highlighted the phrases “United States of America,” “General 
Congress,” and “Free And Independent States” in a “distinctive italic 
script that draws attention to their significance.”
 
30  In the broadsides 
John Dunlap printed—which constituted the first printing of the Dec-
laration—he “highlighted [the same] three terms in its main text by 
means of capital letters.”31  John Hancock sent a copy of the “Dunlap 
Broadside” to General Washington on July 6, 1776, and it was then 
read to his troops.32  A “contemporary report in August 1776 noted 
that when the Declaration was first read out to the Continental 
troops . . . ‘the language of every man’s countenance was, Now we are 
a people!  We have a name among the states of this world!’”33  And 
that name was the United States of America.34
Following the Declaration, the style of this country has remained, 
almost consistently, the “United States of America.”  A subsequent 
 
 
26
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
27
Burnett, supra note 21, at 79.  A pseudonymous letter written by “Republicus” 
addressed to the people of Pennsylvania on June 26, 1776—two days before the so-
called “Committee of Five” submitted the draft of the Declaration to the Continental 
Congress—proclaimed “I shall rejoice to hear the title of the United States of America, in 
order that we may be on a proper footing to negotiate a peace.”  6 AMERICAN ARCHIVES 
1131 (Peter Force, ed. 4th-5th ser., 1846). 
28
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
29
ARMITAGE, supra note 21, at 21-22. 
30
Id. at 22. 
31
Id. 
32
Declaring Independence:  Drafting the Document, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/declara/declara4.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
33
ARMITAGE, supra note 21, at 17-18. 
34
See also id. at 22 (“That is what the Declaration of Independence declared:  that 
the former United Colonies were now ‘the United States of America’ because they 
were ‘free and independent states.’”). 
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draft of the Articles of Confederation, dated July 12, 1776, changed 
the style of the confederacy from the previous “United Colonies of 
North America” to the “The United States of America.”35  The Plan of 
Treaties with France, dated September 17, 1776, refers repeatedly to 
the “United States.”36  The Articles of War, dated September 20, 1776, 
refers to the “armies of the United States.”37  Congress briefly adopted 
the style of the “United States of North America” in its treaty with 
France, dated May 19, 1778.38  However, on July 11, 1778, Congress 
“resolved to drop the word ‘North’ from the title.”39
Under the Articles of Confederation, agreed upon by Congress on 
November 15, 1777, the name of our nation remained constant.  The 
preamble of the Articles declares that “the Delegates of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled did . . . in the Second Year of the 
Independence of America . . . agree to certain articles of Confederation.”
 
40  
Thus stressing the continuity of the government, the Articles specifi-
cally hold that the government was in fact continuing in its second year 
since the Declaration.  This mirrors the English practice of measuring 
the length of a monarch’s reign by counting the number of years 
since her coronation.  When ratified on March 1, 1781, Article I of the 
Articles of Confederation provided that the “[s]tile [sic] of this confe-
deracy shall be ‘The United States of America.’”41  The name of this coun-
try was not limited to domestic recognition; it was also recognized by 
the international community—including England, which had pre-
viously refused to acknowledge the new name.  On September 3, 1783, 
John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay affixed their signatures 
to the Treaty of Paris between “his Britannic Majesty and the United 
States of America.”42
The Constitution continued this style.  On September 17, 1787, its 
preamble boldly proclaimed that “[w]e the people of the United 
States . . .  do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.”
 
43  The goal to “form a more perfect Union”44
 
35
 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 546 (1776). 
 presupposes 
36
Id. at 769. 
37
Id. at 788. 
38
Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6. 
39
Burnett, supra note 21, at 81. 
40
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 pmbl. (emphasis added). 
41
Id. art. I (emphasis added). 
42
Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Bri-
tannic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit.., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 (emphasis added). 
43
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added); see also, Steiker et al, supra note 11, at 240 
(“[The preamble] suggests that the‘United States’ preceded the particular political 
structure established by the new Constitution.”). 
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the existence of a less perfect union—namely the “perpetual Union” 
under the Articles of Confederation.45  Consistent with the date re-
ferred to in Preamble to the Articles of Confederation, Article VII of 
the Constitution concludes that the Constitution was submitted to the 
states in the year “of the independence of the United States of Ameri-
ca the Twelfth.”46
Article VI of the Constitution speaks further to this continuity.  
Clause I provides that “all Debts contracted and Engagements entered 
into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the 
United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.”
 
47  
While the United States was previously governed “under the Confede-
ration,” it would now be governed “under this Constitution,” and 
prior debts are valid.48  Similarly, the Supremacy Clause provides that 
“all Treaties made” under the previous form of government, and 
those treaties which “shall be made [in the future fall] under the Au-
thority of the United States.”49
“What’s in a name?”
  The constitution considers both types 
of treaties the “supreme Law of the Land.”  The Treaty of Paris, signed 
on September 3, 1784, as well as other treaties enacted prior to the ra-
tification of the Constitution, remained valid. 
50
 
44
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
  In the case of the United States, 236 years 
of independence and unity as a nation.  The U.S., as a sovereign, has 
been in continuous existence since 1776.  The Declaration simply 
provides another link in our constitutional chain that stretches from 
1776 to the second year of our independence (when the Articles of 
Confederation were proposed), and to the twelfth year of our inde-
pendence (when the Constitution was proposed).  All of these char-
ters are connected and interrelated.  The Declaration, the Articles of 
45
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) 
(“The Union existed before the Constitution . . . . Prior to that event, it is clear that the 
Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be perpetual, was the sole posses-
sor of external sovereignty and in the Union it remained without change save in so far 
as the Constitution in express terms qualified its exercise.”). 
46
U.S. CONST. art. VII.  Abraham Lincoln began the Gettysburg Address by count-
ing back “[f]our score and seven years ago” from 1863, which was 1776.   See Abraham 
Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:  SPEECHES AND WRIT-
INGS 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).  
47
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
48
See Steiker et al., supra note 11, at 241 (“It is hard to argue that such debts could 
have been created unless there was a ‘United States’ prior to the United States ‘under 
this [particular] Constitution’ to create them.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 1)). 
49
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
50
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
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Confederation, and the Constitution represent three modes of gov-
ernment for one sovereign—our Constitutional Trinity.  While the form 
has changed, the “United States of America,” and the citizens of the 
United States, have remained. 
II.  THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lord Coke’s 
seminal opinion in Calvin’s Case provided the definitive statement of 
how one became a subject of the King of England.  The case held that 
a person’s birthright subjectship was immutable, perpetual, and could 
not be abandoned.51  Rejecting this theory, the American colonists 
turned to the social compact theory of John Locke and the doctrine of 
volitional allegiance to provide an intellectual and philosophical sup-
port for their separation with England.52
A.  Cokean Perpetual Allegiance 
  The American Revolution 
effected a radical change not only in the forms of government, but al-
so in the legal doctrines that justified those governments. 
Calvin’s Case, also known as the Case of the Postnati, was a test case 
to determine the subjectship of the Scots resulting from the union of 
Scotland and England following the coronation of James I, who was 
already James VI of Scotland.53  In this case, Robert Calvin, a postnati—
an infant born after the ascension—was prevented from taking posses-
sion of land to which he was lawfully entitled because he was deemed 
to be an alien,54 and therefore could not inherit land in England.55  
Lord Coke, the chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas, wrote 
what became the “definitive statement of the law.”56
 
51
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 409. 
  In a lengthy and 
somewhat confusing opinion, Coke found that the allegiance a person 
acquires at birth to the sovereign is natural and immutable, and can-
not be relinquished or abandoned.  A subject born under the protec-
tion of the sovereign would remain a subject, even if the sovereign no 
longer provided any protection.  The right of expatriation—that is the 
right to flee the jurisdiction and abjure one’s loyalty—did not exist 
52
See LOCKE, supra note 16, at 149-50. 
53
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 377. 
54
Id. at 409. 
55
Id. at 399.  
56
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 
17 (1978). 
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because subjectship could never be vitiated.57  The antenati—those 
born before their territory was lost, in this case, the Scottish—would 
be bound by an allegiance to both the original sovereign and the con-
quering power.58  Because allegiance was perpetual, subjectship to the 
original sovereign could never be eliminated.  When England con-
quered Scotland, a subject’s initial allegiance to Scotland remained, 
and a new allegiance became due to the conquering English.  Flowing 
from this perpetual allegiance, Coke reasoned that loyalty need not 
correspond to the current state of politics, but rather derived from the 
natural obligations between a subject and whomever wore the crown.59
B.  Lockean Social Contract Theory 
 
Following the Glorious Revolution, the English Constitution was 
fundamentally changed.  The power of the monarchy was severely li-
mited, while the supremacy of Parliament emerged.  The “[d]octrines 
of consent and parliamentary sovereignty . . . eroded” the holdings of 
Calvin’s Case.60  This political upheaval corresponded with a “major in-
tellectual revolution” embodied in the theories of John Locke.61
Locke rejected Coke’s notion that allegiance resulted from the 
inherent sovereignty of the King and contended that individuals and 
society joined together voluntarily to form social compacts and com-
munities.
 
62
 
57
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 409.  Based on this theory, even after Jay’s Treaty, 
British ships continued to impress Americans captured at sea, claiming that natura-
lized citizens born in England were still subjects of the Crown.  These events eventually 
culminated in the War of 1812. See Charles Gordon, The Citizen and the State:  Power of 
Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 318-19 (1965) (“The executive 
branch of our Government was confronted with realities rather than theories in the 
disputes which led to the War of 1812.  The British Government, claiming that the al-
legiance of its subjects was indelible, was boarding American ships to impress into mili-
tary service American seamen.”). 
  Locke also disagreed with Coke regarding expatriation.  If 
an individual could consent to the rule of a sovereign, that person, or 
even the society as a whole, could also expatriate and withdraw that 
58
Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 398. 
59
Id. at 382. 
60
Id. at 52. 
61
Id. at 44. 
62
See LOCKE, supra note 16, at 197 (“The reason why men enter into society is the 
preservation of their property; and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, 
is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of 
all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of 
every part and member of the society.”); see also KETTNER, supra note 56, at 44 (“[P]art 
of [peoples’] natural independence was relinquished in order to protect their most 
essential liberties.”). 
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While Lockean doctrines “were at least superficially integrated,” 
social compact theory had only a minimal impact on the practical ap-
plication of the law of subjectship in England.
  Locke’s consent-based theory clashed with Coke’s views of 
immutable subjectship. 
64  Most British courts 
continued to rely on Calvin’s Case.65  However, in the American colo-
nies, the “consensual and contractual elements implicit in naturaliza-
tion and in the new political theories of the later seventeenth century 
would slowly emerge to dominate ideas of subjectship and alle-
giance.”66
James Wilson wrote “[a]llegiance to the king and obedience to the 
parliament are founded on very different principles.  The former is 
founded on protection: the latter, on representation.”
  The colonists turned to the Lockean view of the contractual 
basis of society in which allegiance was tied to protection. 
67  Similarly, Alex-
ander Hamilton noted that the connection with Great Britain and the 
colonies was formed “by the ties of blood, interest, and mutual protec-
tion,” and “[w]hen . . . lives and properties are at stake, it would be 
foolish and unnatural to refrain from such measures as might preserve 
them.”68  Under this view, the colonies would not necessarily be bound 
by the acts of Parliament unless they so consented.  Locke described 
this reciprocal relationship in terms of a trust, and noted that “gov-
ernments are dissolved” when the “[t]he legislative acts against the 
trust reposed in them.”69
John Adams observed that unlike the case in Ireland, Parliament’s 
authority to rule the colonies was not “founded on the consent and 
 
 
63
See LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 (“[I]t is in their legislative, that the members of 
a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body.  
This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth . . . when the leg-
islative is broken or dissolved, dissolution and death follows.”); see also KETTNER, supra 
note 56, at 54 (arguing that Locke’s position might be interpreted to allow a termina-
tion of one’s obligation to the sovereign). 
64
See id. at 45, 52 (noting that in the nineteenth century, citation to Coke’s re-
ports was “virtually mandatory[,]” thereby limiting competing theories of citizenship). 
65
Id. at 45. 
66
Id. at 60.  The colonists thought of allegiance “as a contractual, quid pro quo 
relationship in which the privileges of membership could be claimed as a right by the 
person who chose to contribute his efforts and talents to the welfare of the communi-
ty.”  Id. at 107. 
67
JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of 
the British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721, 736-37 (Robert Green 
McCloskey ed., 1967). 
68
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress, etc., in AL-
EXANDER HAMILTON:  WRITINGS 10, 16 (Library of America 2001).  
69
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 197. 
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compact” of the Americans.70  Allegiance to the king was earned in re-
ciprocity for protection.  James Wilson noted that “the duties of the 
king and those of the subject are plainly reciprocal: they can be vi-
olated on neither side, unless they be performed on the other.”71  Re-
cognizing this reciprocal duty, one of the grievances against the king 
in the Declaration was that “[h]e . . . abdicated Government, by dec-
laring [the colonists] out of his Protection and waging War against 
[them].”72  In the words of Locke, “[w]here there is no longer the 
administration of justice, for the securing of men’s rights . . . there 
certainly is no government left.”73
This notion formed the legal predicate of the Declaration.  
Locke’s “theory was beautifully adapted for those who wished to legi-
timize alterations and revolutions in government”—including the 
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—”without sanc-
tioning as a necessary first step the obliteration of all authority and all 
obligation.”
 
74  Locke distinguished “between the dissolution of the so-
ciety, and the dissolution of the government.”75
 
70
NOVANGLUS [JOHN ADAMS], Addressed to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachu-
setts Bay April 3, 1775, in NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS, OR, POLITICAL ESSAYS, 
at 118, 118 (Hews & Goss 1819). 
  “Whenever the society 
is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot re-
71
JAMES WILSON, Speech Delivered in the Convention for the Province of Pennsylvania 
(Jan. 1775), in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 67, at 747, 753-54.   
72
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); see also, PA. CONST. of 1776 
reprinted in 5 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS 3081, 
3081(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (“And whereas the inhabitants of this com-
monwealth have in consideration of protection only, heretofore acknowledged alle-
giance to the king of Great Britain; and the said king has not only withdrawn that pro-
tection, but commenced, and still continues to carry on, with unabated vengeance, a 
most cruel and unjust war against them . . . all allegiance . . . to the said king . . . are 
dissolved.”). 
73
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 219.  Locke also wrote that government may be dis-
solved “[w]hen he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and abandons that 
charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution.  This is de-
monstratively to reduce all to anarchy. ”).  Id. 
74
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 144;  see also LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 (“Besides 
this overturning from without, governments are dissolved from within.  First, [w]hen 
the legislative is altered. . . . When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make 
laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, 
which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to 
be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think 
best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would im-
pose any thing upon them.”). 
75
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194. 
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main.”76  Following the dissolution of society, “men returned to the 
state of nature, and all political obligation ceased.”77
In contrast, “[t]he world is too well instructed in, and too forward 
to allow of, this [reversion to the state of nature following the] dissolv-
ing of governments.”
 
78  When there is a dissolution of government, 
people do not need to return to the state of nature, and in fact politi-
cal obligations could continue, though loyalties would be transferred 
to the new sovereign.79  Returning to the state of nature does “not 
[occur] upon every little mismanagement in public affairs.  Great mis-
takes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all 
the slips of human frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny 
or murmur.”80  Or, as Jefferson phrased it in the Declaration, 
“[p]rudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established 
should not be changed for light and transient Causes.”81
One could characterize the transition from rule under King 
George III to rule under the Declaration as a Lockean dissolution of 
society.  The previous colonial structure, along with all attendant po-
litical obligations and allegiances to it, ceased.  Through this social 
compact, a new society was formed.  On May 10, 1776, the remnants 
of the Virginia House of Burgesses, speaking through the presidency 
of Edmund Pendleton, agreed that the king’s actions had caused a 
dissolution of their society “in the Lockean sense.”
 
82  With this dissolu-
tion, all prior allegiances were nullified: “It being their opinion, that 
the people could not now be legally represented according to the an-
cient constitution, which has been subverted by the king, lords, and 
commons of Great Britain, and consequently dissolved, they unanim-
ously dissolved themselves accordingly.”83
 
76
Id.  
  In Bayard v. Singleton, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court wrote that the Revolutionary War had 
created a state of nature in which the former subjects of the Crown 
were in “a similar situation with a set of people ship-wrecked and cast 
77
See KETTNER, supra note 56, at 53 (discussing Lockean views of allegiance). 
78
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 193-94.  
79
Id. 
80
Id. at 199.  
81
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).  
82
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 168. 
83
VIRGINIA GAZETTE, May 10, 1776, available at 
http://research.history.org/DigitalLibrary/VirginiaGazette/VGImagePopup.cfm?ID=5
562&Res=HI;  see also KETTNER, supra note 56, at 168 (making note of the reaction of 
the remaining Virginia House of Burgesses).   
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on a maroon’d island—without laws, without magistrates, without 
government, or any legal authority.”84
In contrast, the evolution from the Declaration to the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution marks dissolutions of government.  
While the Declaration abjured all allegiances to Britain, this tripartite 
transformation maintained allegiances to the government of the 
United States, albeit in a different form.  “As long as government con-
tinued to operate legitimately, protecting life, liberty, and property, 
individual subjects were bound.”
 
85  Citizenship and allegiances did not 
change as the form of government evolved.  A citizen under the Dec-
laration became a citizen under the Articles, and then became a citi-
zen under the Constitution.86
III.  CITIZENSHIP FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION 
  The amendment process, as articulated in 
Article V of the Constitution, permits future generations to add addition-
al links to our constitutional chain.  Rather than effecting a dissolution of 
government in the Lockean sense—whereby a new charter of govern-
ment is established—the Constitution, through the consent of the ratifi-
cation conventions, permits the efficacious evolution of government. 
Locke’s contract theory was aptly suited to explain how those who 
accepted the sovereignty of the Continental Congress became citizens: 
they willingly entered into a compact.  But what happened to the citi-
zenship of the loyalist dissenters?  In this sense, “Locke’s theoretical 
scheme was thus ill equipped to deal with the difficult problems of 
choice raised by the American Revolution.”87
A.  Imposing Citizenship Following Independence 
  Two doctrines emerged 
to explain citizenship for the antenati.  The first was premised on the 
state’s imposing citizenship—regardless of the person’s willingness—
and the second was based on the granting of citizenship to those who 
so elected. 
The first doctrine postulated that when the majority chose to dec-
lare independence, everyone was required to submit to the newly or-
dained-and-established government, because the United States was the 
 
84
1 N.C. (Mart.) 42, 43 (1787). 
85
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 143-44.  
86
See infra Part IV. 
87
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 190. 
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proper successor to the Crown.88  In Ainslie v. Martin, Chief Justice 
Parsons of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted this ra-
tionale.89  At issue in this case was the citizenship of an infant born in 
Massachusetts in 1774, who left prior to the Declaration, and never re-
turned.90  The Court held that the Declaration resulted in an automat-
ic transfer of allegiance.  Parsons found that “all persons born within 
the territories of the government and people, although before the 
declaration of independence, were born within the allegiance of the 
same government and people, as the successor of the former sove-
reign, who had abdicated his throne.”91  The American government 
served “as [the King’s] successor, [and therefore] the same govern-
ment and people [] succeeded to all the crown lands within the terri-
tory, as lawfully appertaining to them.”92
 
88
Id. at 190-92.  The Court in Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrator shared the view 
that U.S. citizenship was imposed upon colonists once the majority declared indepen-
dence, noting that  
  Accordingly, “all persons, 
born within the territories of the province of Massachusetts Bay dur-
ing the reign of the late king, are considered as born within the alle-
giance of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, as his lawful succes-
[i]f it be asked, in whom, during our revolution [sic] war, was lodged, and by 
whom was exercised this supreme authority [referring to the powers of “war 
and peace”]?  No one will hesitate for an answer.  It was lodged in, and exer-
cised by, Congress; it was there, or no where; the states individually did not, 
and, with safety, could not exercise it . . . As to war and peace, and their neces-
sary incidents, Congress, by the unanimous voice of the people, exercised ex-
clusive jurisdiction, and stood, like Jove, amidst the deities of old, paramount, 
and supreme. 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81 (1795); see also LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 (“[T]he essence 
and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once estab-
lished by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will.”).  
89
See 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 454, 458 (1813) (“Thus the government became a repub-
lick, possessing all the rights vested in the former sovereign; among which was the 
right to the allegiance of all persons born within the territory of the province of Massa-
chusetts Bay.”). 
90
Id. at 455. 
91
Id. at 459. 
92
Id.; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 
(1936) (“Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but 
sovereignty survives.  A political society cannot endure without a supreme will some-
where.  Sovereignty is never held in suspense.  When, therefore, the external sove-
reignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the 
Union.” (citing Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 80-81)); LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194 
(“The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby 
provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, 
and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and ap-
pointment of the people; without which no one man, or number of men, amongst 
them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest.”).  
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sor.”93  In this sense, the establishment of a new republic was intert-
wined with the instantiation of a new political character—a citizen of 
the United States.  In the words of David Ramsay (a member of the 
second Continental Congress) following the separation with England, 
Americans present during the Declaration “became coequal citizens, and, 
collectively, assumed all the rights of sovereignty.”94  Those who were 
“parties to this solemn act” became citizens and “were the founders of the 
United States.”95
A different strand of citizenship doctrine resembled a hybrid of 
Lockean and Cokean theories.  People could become citizens either 
through consent or through conquest.
 
96  Locke’s social contract 
theory accounted for those persons who voluntarily accepted the new 
government, while the doctrine of conquest from Calvin’s Case—
whereby those conquered owed obedience to the conquerors even if 
they dissented from their rule—accounted for loyalist dissenters.97
In Read v. Read,
 
98 the Virginia Supreme Court adopted this theory 
and noted that “loyalists became citizens—albeit unwilling—not be-
cause of their birth or residence in America, but because they had 
been conquered.”99  Those who refused to assent to the new govern-
ment were “legitimated . . . by virtue of the implied compact only.”100
 
93
Ainslie, 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) at 459 (emphasis omitted).  
  
This holding evinces glimpses of Calvin’s Case, viewing citizenship as 
perpetual and subject to change only in form.  In the same sense that 
an antenatus of Scotland obtained a new allegiance to England follow-
ing the conquest, an antenatus of the colony of Virginia obtained new 
citizenship to the Commonwealth of Virginia under the authority and 
auspices of the Declaration and the Continental Congress.  Combin-
ing both of these theories, the majority could consent to the new gov-
ernment while the dissenting loyalists had citizenship imposed on them, 
94
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 4.  This “anti-Smith tract” was prepared to challenge the 
qualifications of William Smith in the House of Representatives.  See 1 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1788-1790, at 195 n.2 (Merrill Jensen 
& Robert A. Becker eds., 1976).  The reliability of Ramsay’s dissertation as a historical 
document, rather than as a political broadside, is suspect. 
95
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 5. 
96
See KETTNER, supra note 56, at 192. 
97
Id . 
98
9 Va. (5 Call) 160, 201 (1804). 
99
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 192. 
100
Id.  
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often against their will.101
B.  Citizenship by Election 
  This holding sounds in Coke, though it is in 
tension with Lockean theory. 
The doctrine of citizenship through imposition—which essentially 
coerced a loyalist dissenter to assume a new allegiance—presented 
theoretical difficulties for Americans.  These doctrines conflicted with 
the spirit of the Declaration, which was predicated on consent to a so-
cial compact.  If Americans were not willing to swear allegiance to King 
George III against their will, then they should not have considered their 
allegiance to a new American sovereign sworn without their consent.  As 
Locke phrased it, “[w]hen any one, or more, shall take upon them to 
make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws 
without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey.”102
In response to the shortcoming in both of these theories, the 
states developed a “doctrine of the right of election.”
 
103  The premise 
was simple: “Citizenship in the new republics was to begin with indi-
vidual consent.”104  Ramsay wrote that “[c]itizenship, acquired by tacit 
consent, is exclusively confined to the cases of persons who have re-
sided within the United States since the declaration of indepen-
dence.”105  The binding choice of loyalty had to be made within a certain  
period of time.  As articulated by William Tilghman, who argued on be-
half of the petitioner in M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee  “[i]n revolutions, every 
man has a right to take his part.  He is excusable, if not bound in duty to 
take that part which in his conscience he approves.”106
During the “period of governmental disorganization, accompany-
ing independence . . . . individuals had some time to consider their 
choice of allegiance.”
 
107
 
101
Of course, only a small percentage of the populace expressly offered  consent 
to adopt this new government.  Further, it is quite tragic and slightly ironic that while 
most slaves, native Indians, and women could not become citizens, certain loyalists 
were essentially conscripted into citizenship.  Nevertheless, these doctrines laid the in-
tellectual and philosophical groundwork for the extension of citizenship and equality 
to all in theory, if not in practice.  Tragically, the promise of citizenship for all people 
was not realized until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
  An election of loyalty occurred, “explicitly, 
when they acknowledged the legitimacy of the new states or, implicit-
ly, when they accepted the protection of the new constitutions and 
102
LOCKE, supra note 16, at 194. 
103
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 193. 
104
Id. at 194. 
105
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 7-8 (emphasis omitted). 
106
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 281 (1805).  
107
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 194. 
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laws.”108  The length of the period of election depended “upon when 
legitimate, protective laws came into being in the respective states.”109  
“Americans acknowledged the right of the state to dictate the timing 
of election” while only the individual “would be responsible for mak-
ing the choice between subjectship and citizenship.”110  If a person 
chose not to exercise election, he could exercise the complementary 
right of expatriation by departing the United States and swearing alle-
giances to another sovereign.  Following the Revolution, “most Ameri-
cans necessarily accepted the right of expatriation.”111  Once the elec-
tion was made and acknowledged by the state, with certain exceptions, 
a citizen generally could not change his status.112  Following the Revo-
lution, most states started to adopt the election doctrine.113
IV.  CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
In the wake of the Declaration, citizenship of the United States, a 
previously unrecognized political construct, was born.  While in the 
past “subjectship” defined one’s allegiance to the king,114 “[t]he status 
of ‘American citizen’ was the creation of the Revolution.”115  In the 
words of Ramsay, Americans had, following the Revolution, “changed 
from subjects to citizens” and the “difference [was] immense.”116  Citi-
zenship, in contrast with Cokean subjectship, was not based on perpe-
tual allegiance, but rather flowed from individual consent.  This new 
status was created to “govern membership in a free society:  republi-
can citizenship ought to rest on consent; it ought to be uniform and 
without invidious gradations; and it ought to confer equal rights.”117
This Part considers how this citizenship was understood at three 
distinct points in our early history.  First, in treason cases, the court 
 
 
108
Id. 
109
Id. 
110
Id. at 208. 
111
GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 248 (2009). 
112
See Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 247 (1830) (noting that the Treaty 
of Paris “took the actual state of things as its basis” for purposes of election so that “all 
those . . . who then adhered to the American states, were virtually absolved from all 
allegiance to the British crown”). 
113
See KETTNER, supra note 56, at 194 (“Citizenship in the new republics was to be-
gin with individual consent.”). 
114
Id. at 187 (“Citizenship supplanted subjectship as the source of protection 
shifted from George III to the independent states.”). 
115
Id. at 208.  
116
RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 3. 
117
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 10. 
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needed to determine whether the accused was a foreign alien levying 
war against the United States, or a disloyal citizen engaged in sedition.  
Central to this decision was the application of a concept of citizenship 
to the status of the defendant.  Second, while the Constitutional Con-
vention largely ignored issues of citizenship, members of the first 
Congress shed light on this issue in challenges to the qualifications of 
an elected representative.  Third, in adjudications of Jay’s Treaty, 
courts needed to ascertain whether claimants of property and damag-
es were U.S. citizens, both at the time of the Revolution and prior to 
the Treaty of Paris.  Each of these historical epochs reflects a consis-
tent application of the doctrine of citizenship through election. 
A.  Treason Prosecutions 
The first Articles of War, enacted by the Continental Congress on 
June 30, 1775, provided for punishment for treason by those under 
the authority of the Continental Army.118  The question of allegiance 
was an initial inquiry in any treason prosecution, as “[t]reason indict-
ments necessarily included a statement that the accused in fact owed 
allegiance to the state.”119  A person deemed to be a subject of Eng-
land could wage war against America, and could not be found guilty 
of treason, for his loyalty lay with the crown.  In contrast, a disloyal cit-
izen of the United States could be prosecuted for treason, for his 
loyalty was to the United States.  The treason statute, broadly con-
strued, applied to “[a]nyone, alien or citizen, permanent resident or 
visitor, who enjoyed the protection of the government.”120
The leading treason case is Respublica v. Chapman, a Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case decided by Chief Justice M’Kean in 1781.
 
121
 
118
See BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON 29-30 (1964) (explaining 
that people could be punished for, among other offenses, mutiny, sedition, providing 
supplies to the enemy, and harboring an enemy). 
  Sa-
muel Chapman was born in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and on De-
119
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 181. 
120
CHAPIN, supra note 118, at 71. 
121
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53 (Pa. 1781). Chapman was selected for inclusion in the U.S. 
Reports even though it was decided seven years before the Constitutional Convention, 
and the case has been cited in numerous Supreme Court opinions. See Eugene Volokh, 
Little-Known Weird Legal Fact Leads to Glitch in Court of Appeals Opinion, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (May 8, 2006, 1:27 pm), http://volokh.com/2006/05/08/little-known-
weird-legal-fact-leads-to-glitch-in-court-of-appeals-opinion (“Volume 1 of U.S. Reports is 
occupied entirely by cases from Pennsylvania . . . [because] Alexander Dallas, the en-
trepreneur who published the cases, included the other courts’ cases to make the vo-
lumes [of Supreme Court cases] more salable, since the U.S. Supreme Court produced 
relatively few cases in its early years.”). 
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cember 26, 1776, following what must have been an eventful Christ-
mas, he “departed and joined the enemy.”122  In a proclamation dated 
June 15, 1778, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania or-
dered the “attainder of divers traitors.”123
The resolution of this case hinged on whether Chapman was ever 
a U.S. citizen.  If he was, the attainder was valid, and he would be con-
sidered a traitor.  If not, and he remained a British citizen, the at-
tainder was ineffective.  In that situation, Chapman could be punished 
as a foreign enemy but he could not be considered a traitor.  The at-
torney general alleged that Chapman was “an inhabitant and subject 
of” Pennsylvania, and thus a traitor.
 
124  Chapman replied that he was a 
“subject of the king of Great Britain” and had never “been a subject or 
inhabitant of” Pennsylvania.125
Chapman’s counsel argued that “on the 26th December, 1776, 
there was no government established in Pennsylvania, from which 
[Chapman] could receive protection; and consequently, there was 
none to which he could owe allegiance—protection and allegiance be-
ing political obligations of a reciprocal nature.”
 
126  In Chapman’s view, 
because no government existed when he fled Pennsylvania, he could 
not have received any protection and thus owed no loyalty to the state.  
The attorney general countered that “[b]y the declaration of inde-
pendence, on the 4th July, 1776, every State in the union was solemnly 
declared to be free and independent,” and on “the 26th day of De-
cember, 1776 . . . [Chapman] was certainly a subject of the state of 
Pennsylvania, under the constitution agreed to on the 28th day of 
September preceding.”127  This argument—that Chapman became a cit-
izen as a result of the majority’s consenting consenting to the new un-
ion—mirrored the position taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts in Ainslie v. Martin.128  Chief Justice M’Kean sought to 
determine whether Chapman “was to be considered as an inhabitant and 
subject of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at the time of his depar-
ture.”129
 
122
Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 53. 
 
123
Id. 
124
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
125
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
126
Id. 
127
Id. at 54, 55. 
128
9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 454 (1813). 
129
Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 53. 
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M’Kean found that even though an official constitution had not 
been established, “a formal compact is not a necessary foundation of 
government; for, if an individual had assumed the sovereignty, and 
the people had assented to it, whatever limitations might afterwards 
have been imposed, still this would have been a legal establish-
ment.”130
Locke says, that when the Executive is totally dissolved, there can be no 
treason; for laws are a mere nullity; unless there is a power to execute 
them.  But that is not the case at present . . . for before the meeting of 
Council in March, 1777, all its members were chosen, and the legislature 
was completely organized: so that there did antecedently exist a power 
competent to redress grievances, to afford protection, and, generally, to 
execute the laws; and allegiance being naturally due to such a power, we 
are of opinion, that from the moment it was created, the crime of High 
Treason might have been committed by any person, who was then a sub-
ject of the Commonwealth.
  M’Kean continued: 
131
The Court found that Chapman owed allegiance from the date 
that the legislature had convened.
 
132  Despite the fact that following a 
civil war “the voice of the majority must be conclusive, . . . the minority 
have, individually, an unrestrainable right to remove with their prop-
erty into another country . . . and, in short, that none are subjects of 
the adopted government, who have not freely assented to it.”133
Cognizant of the climate in which he judged—the Revolution was 
still raging throughout the colonies—Chief Justice M’Kean noted that 
  This 
represented the period of election.  Chapman exercised his right of 
election, and expatriated from Pennsylvania a month before the first 
statute had been passed under the new Constitution, and three 
months prior to the point where all three branches of the government 
were in operation. 
[t]his construction, it may be said, is favorable to traitors, and tends to 
prejudice of the Commonwealth.  But we cannot be influenced by obser-
vations of a political nature in the exposition of the law; it is our duty to 
seek for, and to declare, the true intention of the Legislature; the policy 
of that intention, it is their duty to consider.
134
 
130
Id. at 56. 
 
131
Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted). 
132
Id. 
133
Id. at 58. 
134
Id. at 59. 
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Still, M’Kean charged, “[i]t is better to err on the side of mercy, than 
of strict justice.”135  With this charge favorable to the accused, the jury 
acquitted Chapman.136
Citizenship by election emerged as the dominant view in later 
court decisions.  In North Carolina, following the Declaration, people 
had an inherent right to elect their choice of citizenship resulting 
from the state of nature formed by the Revolution.
 
137  North Carolina 
solemnized this election in an act passed in April of 1777, offering all 
residents “the option of taking an oath of allegiance, or of departing 
the state.”138  The New York Supreme Court later adopted a similar 
view in Jackson v. White, holding that “[e]very member of the old gov-
ernment must have the right to decide for himself, whether he will 
continue with a society which has so fundamentally changed its condi-
tion.”139  Ultimately, this view was adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court in M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee.140
B.  Citizenship of the United States as Determined by State Law 
 
While the Constitutional Convention featured spirited discussion 
about how long a person needed to be a U.S. citizen in order to serve 
in Congress, there was sparse debate over how citizenship should be 
defined.  On August 13, 1787, Gouverneur Morris “moved to add to 
the end of the section [governing the citizenship qualifications] a 
proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights 
of any person now a Citizen.”141
 
135
Id. at 60. 
  This motion essentially sought to cre-
dit determinations of state citizenship when considering U.S. citizen-
ship.  In other words, if a person was a citizen under state law, the re-
quirements of being a citizen of the United States for seven years in 
order to qualify for Congress need not apply. 
136
Id.  
137
See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 8 (1787) (recognizing a landowner’s 
decision pursuant to an act of the legislature to return to Great Britain and thereby 
remain a British subject). 
138
Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 336, 339 (Cir. Ct. D.N.C. 1792)(No. 5,980) 
(Ellsworth, J.); see also RAMSAY, supra note 1, at 5 (“Those who refused [to take oaths] 
were ordered to depart, as being patrons unfriendly to the revolution.”). 
139
20 Johns. 313, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). 
140
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 284 (1805) (“When the Revolution was proposed, he 
had a right to chuse [sic] his side.”). 
141
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
439 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840). 
2010] Original Citizenship 117 
John Mercer of Maryland seconded this motion, noting that “[i]t 
was necessary . . . to prevent a disfranchisement of persons who had 
become Citizens under and on the faith & according to the laws & 
Constitution from being on a level in all respects with natives.”142  
Mercer was referring to citizenship granted by state constitutions un-
der the Declaration and later the Articles of Confederation.  James 
Wilson, himself an immigrant, “who was instrumental in framing the 
Constitution and who served as one of the original Members of [the 
Supreme] Court,”143 sided with Morris and Mercer.  Wilson noted that 
the Pennsylvania Constitution gave “to foreigners after two years resi-
dence all the rights whatsoever of citizens,” and the Articles of Confe-
deration made “the Citizens of one State Citizens of all.”144  From 
these laws, Wilson argued that Pennsylvania was obligated to “main-
tain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign birth.”145
Roger Sherman disagreed with Morris, Mercer, and Wilson, ar-
guing that “[t]he U[nited] States have not invited foreigners nor 
pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with native 
Citizens.  The Individual States alone have done this.”
 
146
Madison criticized Sherman’s contention and asserted that the 
delegates are the “Agents” of the states that “appoint[ed] this Conven-
tion,” and will “ratify its proceedings.”
  Though the 
states had granted citizenship, Sherman argued that the United States 
need not recognize this citizenship. 
147  Madison further explained 
that “[i]f the new Constitution then violates the faith pledged” to any 
naturalized citizens, “the States [would] be the violators” of the Con-
stitution.148  The United States should thus respect the naturalization 
and citizenship decisions of the states.  Wilson also read the Comity 
Clause of the Articles of Confederation and “inferred the obligation 
Pen[nsylvania] was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her 
citizens of foreign birth.”149  Likewise, Mercer agreed that the United 
States should not begin its existence by a “breach of faith.”150
 
142
Id. 
 
143
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 10 (1994). 
144
MADISON, supra note 141, at 441; see also PA. CONST. of 1776 § 42 (“Every fo-
reigner of good character who comes to settle in this state . . . shall not be capable of 
being elected a representative until after two years residence.”). 
145
MADISON, supra note 141, at 441. 
146
Id. at 440. 
147
Id. 
148
Id. 
149
Id. at 441. 
150
Id. 
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Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina disagreed with Madison, and 
“remarked that the laws of the States had varied much the terms of 
naturalization in different parts of America; and contended that the 
United States could not be bound to respect them.”151
The Convention voted down Morris’s provision by a vote of six to 
five, with Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Vir-
ginia voting “aye,” and New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia voting “no.”
  In other words, 
he argued that the United States need not give credence to the natu-
ralization laws of the states. 
152  While 
the delegates to the Convention defeated this provision by a close 
vote, the first Congress expressly repudiated it.  Only two years later 
during its vital term,153 based on the arguments on James Madison, the 
first Congress adopted the position that pledges made by the states 
prior to the ratification of the Constitution determine qualifications 
for the House.154
In the first congressional election, the American people elected 
nine representatives and senators who were not born in the United 
States, four of whom had signed the Constitution in Philadelphia.
 
155  
Yet it was the election of William Smith, who was born in South Caroli-
na but grew up in Europe, which resulted in the first constitutional chal-
lenge in the House of Representatives under the Qualifications Clause of 
Article I.156
Smith was born in South Carolina to a family that traced its li-
neage to the first settlers of the colony.  In 1774, he left for Geneva to 
pursue an education, and stayed there until 1778.
 
157
 
151
Id. 
  He later traveled 
152
Id. at 442. Rhode Island was not represented at the Constitutional Convention, 
and New York did not cast a vote on this issue. 
153
James Madison told Thomas Jefferson that the First Congress was “in a wilder-
ness without a single footstep to guide us. Our successors will have an easier task.” 
WOOD, supra note 111, at 55 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FED-
ERAL ELECTIONS (Merrill Jenson & Robert A. Becker eds., 1976)). 
154
See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:  Substantive Issues in the First 
Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 861 (1994) (noting Madison’s leadership 
on this issue) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 420-23 (Joseph Gates ed., 1834)).  
155
See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, U.S. CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) 
(providing a directory in which one can enter names of relevant congressmen—in this 
case Burke, Butler, Fitzsimons, Jackson, Johnston, Laurence, Morris, Paterson, and 
Tucker—to access their biographies).  
156
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789-1834, supra note 6, at 23.  
157
Id. at 26.   
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to Paris—where he “resided two months as an American gentleman 
[and] was received in that character by Dr. Franklin [and] Mr. 
Adams”—and London, where he studied law.158  He returned to the U.S. 
in 1783, and upon “his arrival at Charleston, he was received by his coun-
trymen as a citizen of the State of South Carolina.”159  Smith was elected 
as a member of the State Legislature and Privy Council.160  After his elec-
tion to the House in 1788, his seat was contested on the grounds that he 
had not yet been “seven year a citizen of the United States.”161
In September 1779, the South Carolina Legislature determined 
that it was in “the interest of the State that [young men who were sent 
abroad for their education] should be allowed to continue in Europe 
till they were twenty-two years of age.”
 
162  The legislature also deter-
mined that a double tax should be imposed upon those young men 
who chose not to return, but expressly preserved their citizenship 
rights.163
was admitted to offices of trust, to which aliens were not admissible, and 
as he was admitted to them without having the rights of citizenship con-
ferred upon him, in pursuance of [the 1784 naturalization] act, it fol-
lowed clearly that the people of South Carolina and the Legislature ac-
knowledged him to be a citizen by virtue of the revolution.
  Because Smith 
164
Smith argued that his guardians in South Carolina who represented 
him stood “in loco parentis,” and offered that they were “residents . . . at 
the declaration of independence.”
 
165
the declaration of independence affected him as much, though at Gene-
va, as it did those in Carolina; his happiness, that of his dearest connex-
ions, his property, were deeply interested in it:  his fate was so closely 
connected with that of Carolina, that any revolution in Carolina was a 
revolution of him.  Though a minor, as soon as he heard of the inde-
pendence of America, he considered himself an American citizen.
  Smith proclaimed that 
166
According to this strand of volitional allegiance, no election was ne-
cessary; citizenship was imposed by virtue of the Declaration. 
 
Ramsay, the challenger, countered that the state “could not con-
fer citizenship on Americans who were absent when independence 
 
158
Id. 
159
Id.   
160
Id. at 26-27. 
161
Id. at 23. 
162
Id. at 26.   
163
Id. at 27. 
164
Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
165
Id. at 29. 
166
Id. 
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was declared . . . and anterior to their returning and joining their 
country under its new and independent Government.”167  Ramsay dis-
puted that birth in the United States before the Revolution conferred 
citizenship, as those “who have neither done nor hazarded anything 
for our independence” should not be allowed to claim citizenship 
merely “from the circumstance of their having been born in this coun-
try.”168  Ramsay would have required some form of election, whereby 
Smith affirmatively returned to the United States to assert his loyalties.169
Representative James Madison weighed in on this issue, and deli-
vered nearly four pages of remarks.  He began by stating that “from a 
consideration of the principles established by the revolution, the con-
clusion I have drawn is, that Mr. Smith was, on the declaration of in-
dependence, a citizen of the United States.”
 
170  Madison sought to rely 
on the “laws and constitution of South Carolina” and to be “guided by 
principles of a general nature.”171  Madison reasoned from an “estab-
lished maxim” that the place of birth is “the most certain criterion” of 
citizenship, and this rule “applies in the United States.”172
Madison noted that there are two allegiances that a citizen owes: 
“the primary allegiance which we owe to that particular society of 
which we are members, and the secondary allegiance we owe to the 
sovereign established by that society.”
 
173  While the latter is ephemeral, 
the former is fixed.  What happened “when the dissolution of [the al-
legiance of the American people] took place by the declaration of in-
dependence?”174  The “primary allegiance” was retained, and owed to 
the “new community” based on the “community in which [the citizen] 
was born.”175
If a person was born in the colony of South Carolina, following Ju-
ly 4, 1776, the primary allegiance was now owed to the newly formed 
state of South Carolina.  However, a citizen was “absolved from the 
 
 
167
Id. at 32.  These arguments concerning citizenship for those outside the United 
States during the time of the Declaration of Independence closely track Ramsay’s posi-
tion in A Dissertation on the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen of 
the United States.  See generally RAMSAY, supra note 1. 
168
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, supra note 6, at 32.  
169
Id. at 31. 
170
Id. at 32. 
171
Id. 
172
Id. at 33. 
173
Id.   
174
Id.  
175
Id. 
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secondary allegiance he had owed to the British sovereign.”176
[w]hen that society separated from Great Britain, [Smith] was bound by 
that act, and his allegiance transferred to that society, or the sovereign 
which that society should set up . . . . Mr. Smith being, then, at the decla-
ration of independence, a minor, but being a member of that particular 
society, he became, in my opinion, bound by the decision of the society, 
with respect to the question of independence and change of Govern-
ment.”
  Madi-
son noted that 
177
Smith, an antenatus, was entitled to citizenship upon the Declaration, in ac-
cordance with the laws of South Carolina, regardless of where he resided. 
 
Several members disagreed with Madison.  Representative Boudi-
not “expressed an apprehension” that “the natives of America who 
had deserted their country’s cause during the late war” would be per-
mitted to serve in Congress.178  Representative Jackson remarked that 
America “at the time of the revolution, was not properly to be com-
pared to a people altering their mode or form of Government.”179  Ra-
ther, the “whole allegiance or compact [was] dissolved”180 and there 
was a “total reversion to a state of nature.”181  During this period of 
limbo, those living in America “had no general or Federal govern-
ment, or form of constitution, and yet were in arms.”182
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Respublica v. 
Chapman addresses this issue, and contends that the period of election 
could begin following the establishment of a functional govern-
ment.
 
183
After hearing the passionate speeches regarding Smith’s citizen-
ship, the House found “upon mature consideration, that William 
Smith had been seven years a citizen of the United States at the time 
  When the naturalization act was passed in 1779,  South Caro-
lina had a functioning government.  Even if South Carolina had been 
in a veritable state of nature following the Declaration, by 1779 it had 
already established a valid government. 
 
176
Id. 
177
Id. at 34. 
178
Id. at 35.   
179
Id.   
180
Id. at 36. 
181
Id. at 35.   
182
Id. at 36. 
183
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 59 (Pa. 1781). 
122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 95 
PENNumbra 
of his election.”184  The resolution passed thirty-six to one, and “Mr. 
Smith was confirmed in his seat.”185
While the Constitutional Convention narrowly rejected Gouver-
neur Morris’s position—reliance on state law as the basis for U.S. citi-
zenship—the first Congress effectively adopted it by a nearly unanim-
ous margin.  Although the Continental Congress “did not naturalize 
foreigners, it adopted resolutions obliging the states to do so.”
 
186
As Madison remarked, “Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration 
of independence, a citizen at the time of his election, and, conse-
quently, entitled to a seat in this Legislature.”
  In 
this sense, the central government delegated the power to the states, 
and the first Congress’s vote in the Smith case reflects that principle. 
187
C.  Interpretation of Jay’s Treaty 
  If Smith was entitled 
to a seat in the legislature, according to Article I, then he was a citizen 
of the United States.  Madison’s syllogism indicates that a person with 
citizen status , according to the law of the state, at the time of the Dec-
laration, became a citizen of the United States for purposes of the 
Constitution—even though this choice of citizenship predated our 
great charter by thirteen years. 
The Supreme Court later adopted the Chapman view of citizenship 
through election.  In M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, the Court considered 
whether Daniel Coxe was a citizen of the United States or a citizen of 
Britain for purposes of a claim under the terms of Jay’s Treaty.188  If he 
were British, his estate would be unable to inherit lands by descent.189  
Coxe, a resident of New Jersey, chose to fight for the king during the 
Revolution, and considered himself a British subject.190
 
184
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, supra note 
  Unlike Sa-
muel Chapman, who fled from Pennsylvania before the establishment 
6, at 37. 
185
Id.  
186
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 219.  I will address the Continental Congress’s dele-
gation of other powers in future works. 
187
CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 1789–1834, supra note 6, at 35. 
188
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 280 (1805).  Justice Cushing, writing for the Court, re-
marked in a preliminary footnote that “Chief Justice [Marshall] did not sit in this 
cause, having formed a decided opinion on the principal question, while his interest 
was concerned.” Id. at 280 n.<dagger>..  Marshall’s recusal could have stemmed from 
his advocacy in a British debt case.  See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 199 (1796) 
(representing a Virginia debtor, John Marshall argued for the validity of a Virginia sta-
tute passed during the Revolution, which discharged debts to British subjects). 
189
M’Ilvaine, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 280.   
190
Id. at 282.   
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of the government,191 Coxe resided in New Jersey after the establish-
ment of its Constitution on July 2, 1776, and following the enactment 
of its treason statute by the legislature on October 4, 1776.192  At the 
Supreme Court, Coxe’s estate argued that he was an American citizen, 
contending that the New Jersey Constitution had established a new 
society at independence, rendering all inhabitants citizens.193
M’Ilvaine contested this claim, and argued that Coxe’s actions 
showed that his allegiances were with Great Britain.  Relying on Chap-
man, M’Ilvaine argued that Coxe exercised his right of expatriation by 
aligning with Britain after a reasonable period to make his election.
 
194  
Coxe contended that he had resided in New Jersey beyond a reasona-
ble period of election, received protection from the state, and thus 
owed allegiance.195  Even though Coxe was attainted in 1778 for dis-
loyalty, he was still a citizen, and an attainder could not serve as an 
impediment to recovery under Jay’s Treaty.196  Coxe argued that in 
light of the penalties he received as a result of the attainder “resulting 
from his civil relation to the commonwealth,” he should be entitled to 
benefit from that relation.197  Both attorneys “sustained the right to 
elect citizenship as an inherent and necessary consequence of the 
Revolution,” but only differed over the timing of the election.198
The place of Coxe’s birth was not dispositive, as citizenship could 
be modified based on the election, and was not perpetual or immuta-
ble—thus, this holding rejects the reasoning from Calvin’s Case.
 
199
Now . . . those residing at the time of the revolution in the territory sepa-
rating itself from the parent country, are subject to the new government, 
and become members of the new community, on the ground either of 
tacit consent, evidenced by their abiding in such territory; or on the 
principle that every individual is bound by the act of the majority.
 
200
The M’Ilvaine Court held that after the government was estab-
lished and the treason statute was enacted, Coxe “became a member 
of the new society, entitled to the protection of its government, and 
 
 
191
Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 54 (Pa. 1781). 
192
M’Ilvaine, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 282.  
193
Id. 
194
Id. at 283, 285. 
195
Id. at 309. 
196
Id.  
197
Id. at 300. 
198
KETTNER, supra note 56, at 202.  
199
M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 290 (1805). 
200
Id. at 312 (emphasis omitted). 
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bound to that government by the ties of allegiance.”201  The treason 
statute was “conclusive upon the point, that the legislature of that 
state by the most unequivocal declarations, asserted its right to the al-
legiance of such of its citizens as had left the state, and had attempted 
to return to their former allegiance.”202  The determination of U.S. ci-
tizenship under Jay’s Treaty “was left necessarily to depend upon the 
laws of the respective states, who in their sovereign capacities had 
acted authoritatively upon the subject.”203
Chancellor James Kent considered the principles in M’Ilvaine v. 
Coxe’s Lessee to be authoritative in his 1827 commentaries.
  Accordingly, Coxe was not 
an alien, and his estate was entitled to recover. 
204  Justice 
Story advanced those same principles in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s 
Snug Harbor, where he argued in dissent that following the Revolution, 
individuals had time to select their loyalties, and that the Treaty of 
Paris constituted the cutoff date for the period of elections.205
While these cases disagree on the duration of the period of elec-
tion, they all indicate that the United States began with the Declara-
tion, and the period of election concluded well before the Constitu-
tion was ratified in 1789.  If one resided in the United States at the 
time of Independence, and made an election within a reasonable time 
after the establishment of a civil government, that person became a 
“citizen of the United States.”  Original citizenship was born. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The period from 1776 to 1789 did not constitute a constitutional 
interregnum—some kind of legal black hole—that our laws disregard.  
Rather, this period laid the theoretical and legal groundwork to create 
the status of American citizenship, and directly affected the interpre-
tation of our Constitution.  This simple, yet previously unrecognized 
conclusion provides new insights into our legal heritage and chal-
lenges the current state of our constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
201
M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. (2 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808). 
202
Id. at 212-13. 
203
Id. at 215.  
204
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 33-35 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr. 
ed., Legal Classics Library 1986) (1827). 
205
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 159-60 (1830) (Story, J., dissenting).  Justice Story’s dissent 
centered not on principles of citizenship, but on interpreting the technicalities of the 
will.  His view was later adopted by the Court in Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 
247 (1830), which held that the Treaty of Paris had fixed “the state of things as it ex-
isted at that period.” 
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The Declaration cannot be ignored.  For over a century, the Su-
preme Court has held that while the Declaration “may not have the 
force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the 
limits of right and duty . . . it is always safe to read the letter of the 
Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.”206  Jus-
tice Scalia has written that “[t]he Declaration of Independence . . . is 
not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts.”207  Justice 
Elena Kagan reaffirmed this reasoning during her Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings in an exchange with Senator Coburn, remark-
ing that the Declaration lacks the force of law.208
A more complete understanding of the significance of the Decla-
ration—and the laws that the Continental Congress and the states 
passed “in pursuance of” and “under the Authority of” the Declara-
tion—sheds new light on the Constitution.
  So does the Declara-
tion of Independence have the force of law?  Yes, at least with respect 
to notions of “citizenship.”  While this proposition may seem unim-
portant at first blush today—the Fourteenth Amendment constitutio-
nalized American Citizenship in 1868—it shows that one of the canon-
ical doctrines of the Supreme Court is misplaced. 
209  Like “citizenship of the 
United States,” which is based on doctrines that emerged from our 
Independence, other portions of our Constitution are premised on 
powers and rights predating 1789—including a state’s reserved pow-
ers,210 a state’s sovereign immunity,211
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Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901). 
 the privileges or immunities of 
207
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
208
See Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan Nomination 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, (2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/KAGANHEARINGSDAY3.pdf (“I think you should want me to 
act on the basis of law, and—and that is what I have upheld to do, if I’m fortunate 
enough to be . . . confirmed, is to act on the basis of law, which is the Constitutions 
[sic] and the statutes of the United States.”). 
209
The nature and scope of laws—in the words of the Supremacy Clause of Article 
VI—passed “in pursuance of” and “under the Authority of” the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, will be analyzed in future works. 
210
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“The Tenth Amend-
ment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, 
in a given instance, reserve power to the States.” (emphasis added)). 
211
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The 
American Colonies did not enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege unders-
tood in English law to be reserved for the Crown alone . . . .”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (“In determining the sense in which Georgia is a sovereign State, it 
may be useful to turn our attention to the political situation we were in, prior to the Revolu-
tion, and to the political rights which emerged from the Revolution.” (emphasis added)). 
126 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 95 
PENNumbra 
United States citizenship,212 preexisting enumerated rights,213 and the 
rights retained by the people.214
 
  In order to fully understand these 
doctrines, one needs to understand that they have existed since 1776.  
The relevant history for originalist inquiries stretches back further 
than we may have thought.  Whether other provisions of our Constitu-
tion should be understood differently in light of original citizenship 
will be explored in future works. 
 
 
 Preferred Citation:  Josh Blackman, Essay, Original Citizenship, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 95(2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
essays/12-2010/Blackman.pdf. 
 
 
212
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3078 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“The Clause is thus best understood to impose a limitation on state power to infringe 
upon pre-existing substantive rights.” (emphasis added)); see also Josh Blackman & Ilya 
Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed:  Privileges or Immunities, the Constitution in 2020, 
and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1 (2010) (encouraging originalists to embrace the clause); Alan Gura, Ilya Sha-
piro & Josh Blackman, Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms:  The Tell-Tale Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 163, 164-68 (analyzing the inter-
pretation of privileges or immunities clause in McDonald v. Chicago). 
213
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (“[I]t has always been 
widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amend-
ments, codified a pre-existing right.”). 
214
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And in 
my view that right [of parents to direct the upbringing of their children] is also among 
the ‘othe[r] [rights] retained by the people’ which the Ninth Amendment says the Con-
stitution’s enumeration of rights ‘shall not be construed to deny or disparage.’” (em-
phasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IX)). 
